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Abstract 
 
Despite scholarly agreement that complementary capabilities are essential to successful 
collaborations, little is known about how small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) manage 
collaborative innovation through offshoring. Besides, the innovation management literature 
remains generally silent about when supplier joint actions could work in enhancing offshoring 
innovation (OI) performance. The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we aim to delineate 
why supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility predict supplier’s complimentary 
capabilities in OI. Second, we empirically explore the role of supplier joint actions in enhancing 
OI performance. Based on data collected from 200 SMEs having active OI relationships 
spanning four developed European countries, our results propose that supplier’s 
complementary capabilities mediate the relationship between critical relational antecedents 
(supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility) and OI performance. It should be noted, 
however, that despite their incentivising power, supplier joint actions can be a “double-edged 
sword” in SMEs’ OI relationships.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Despite extensive research and general scholarly agreement that complementary capabilities 
are essential to successful offshoring innovation collaborations (Cobena, Gallego, & 
Casanueva, 2017; Jap, 1999; Mindruta, Moeen, & Agarwal, 2016; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; 
Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Van Beers & Zand, 2014), the role 
of suppliers’ complementary capabilities remains underexplored in the case of offshoring  
innovation (OI) in SMEs (Gusenbauer, Massini, & Fink, 2015; Musteen & Ahsan, 2013). We 
envision OI as the act of transferring to the offshore supplier any element of the innovation 
process, including collaborative research and development (R&D), supplier involvement in 
new product development (NPD) and the commercialisation of innovations (Gusenbauer et al., 
2015; Quinn, 2000). For example, consider the significant impact on new product and process 
Offshoring Innovation in SMEs 
3 
 
innovations in manufacturing industries due to the rapid advancement in electronics and 
software technologies (Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007; Quinn, 2000). Moreover, the continuous 
rise in OI relationships since early 2000s has proven that OI allows buying firms to access and 
benefit from offshore suppliers and country-specific resources, such as specialised talents, 
technological advances, and lower innovation costs than in developed countries (Lewin, 
Massani, & Peeters, 2009; Spithoven & Teirlinck, 2015; Van Beers & Zand, 2014). OI in SMEs 
is consistent with the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998) which purports SMEs to engage in 
OI strategies to substitute for in-house deficiencies in innovation resources and capabilities 
(Lewin et al., 2009; Spithoven & Teirlinck, 2015; Teece, 1986). 
 As a dyadic construct, complementary capabilities imply that distinctive capabilities of 
alliance partners are complementary in that their joint performance generates a value that is 
greater than each one by itself (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Enderwick & Buckley, 2017; Gulati, 
Lavie, & Singh, 2009; Jap, 1999; Lavie, 2006; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001; 
Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000). For SMEs, OI provides access to skills and resources that reside with 
the offshore supplier but are strategically essential for the SMEs survival and growth 
(Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 2000; Sarkar et al., 2001). Therefore, given the SMEs’ limited 
internal resources, supplier’s complementary capabilities can act as a shift parameter from a 
“make” to a “buy” innovation strategy (De Vita, Tekaya, & Wang, 2010; Spithoven & 
Teirlinck, 2015). However, to access the synergetic benefits of OI, SMEs should possess 
organisational capabilities to appropriate relational rents from leveraging the supplier’s 
complementary capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998). For example, to manage OI relationships, 
SMEs would need to allocate valuable management resources to coordinate OI projects across 
their national borders (Gusenbauer et al., 2015). Moreover, SMEs should recruit qualified 
boundary spanners to interact with the offshore suppliers, and develop long-term interfirm 
relationships (Munjal, Requejo, & Kundu, 2018; van de Vrande, de Jong, Vanhaverbeke, & de 
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Rochemont, 2009).  Accordingly, SMEs must learn how to compensate for their resource 
disadvantage by increasing the scope and level of interaction with the offshore suppliers 
(Munjal et al., 2018; van de Vrande et al., 2009).  
 Notwithstanding these arguments, it is accepted that SMEs are not simply small 
versions of large firms (Gusenbauer et al., 2015). Consequently, SMEs’ distinctive size and 
managerial characteristics (e.g. resources disadvantages, entrepreneurial mindset, etc.) may 
influence their OI decisions and paths (Gusenbauer et al., 2015; Laforet, 2008; Lee, Park, 
Yoon, & Park, 2010). For example, previous studies argued that SMEs engage in offshoring 
innovation strategies to substitute for in-house deficiency in innovation resources, while large 
firms mainly offshore innovation to complement their innovation activities (Lewin et al., 2009; 
von Haartman & Bengtsson, 2015). Furthermore, innovation studies have shown that although 
SMEs have higher innovative productivity than large firms in terms of idea generation, they 
often lack adequate resources for the commercialisation of innovations, which in turn, 
motivates their OI behaviour (Lee et al., 2010). Besides, SMEs use their relatively flat and 
flexible structure in motivating fast OI decisions (Gusenbauer et al., 2015; Marcati, Guidoa, & 
Peluso, 2008). These specific characteristics of SMEs could mean that they are more likely to 
benefit from OI than large firms due to resource shortcomings and higher propensity to explore 
new ideas (Lee et al., 2010; Musteen & Ahsan, 2013; Mykhaylenko, Motika, Waehrens, & 
Slepniov, 2015). However, the same characteristics can hinder successful selection of suitable 
supplier for OI and limit the SMEs’ control over the OI performance (Gusenbauer et al., 2015; 
Quinn, 2000; Quinn & Hilmer, 1994). In light of these specific characteristics of SMEs, the 
present study aims to investigate the role that supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility 
play in allowing SMEs to exploit supplier’s complementary capabilities in OI relationships. 
Additionally, SMEs are usually a weak representation of the focal firm in dyadic and 
network alliances (Albors-Garrigos, Etxebarria, Hervas-Oliver, & Epelde, 2011; Julien, 1993). 
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Compared to large firms, SMEs often have access to a smaller pool of small or less specialised 
suppliers to choose from (Koufteros, Vickery, & Dorge, 2012; Mindruta et al., 2016). Also, 
SMEs have limited capacity concerning the number of OI relationships they can afford to 
establish and maintain (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009). Thus, aside from their limited choices and 
chances of finding the right offshore suppliers and locations for their OI endeavour, SMEs must 
also learn to master the art of collaborative innovation with offshore suppliers (Gusenbauer et 
al., 2015; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009). 
The OI literature have recognised supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility as two 
relationship specific factors that explain the role of supplier’s complementary capabilities in 
generating relational rents from OI relationships (Chiang, Kocabasoglu‐Hillmer, & Suresh, 
2012; Jap, 1999; Joshi & Stump, 1999; Mudambi & Tallman, 2010; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008; Stump & Heide, 1996; Wang, Li, & Chang, 2016). However, little empirical research 
has shown the links between supplier’s asset specificity and partners’ goal compatibility and 
the SMEs’ ability to leverage supplier’s complementary capabilities as a source of relational 
rent in OI relationships (Gusenbauer et al., 2015). Against this backdrop, in this study we aim 
to delineate: (1) why the supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility predict the 
supplier’s complementary capabilities, and (2) how the supplier’s complementary capabilities 
might affect the performance of OI in SMEs. 
Considerable supply chain literature suggested that rewarding suppliers by experimenting 
with them jointly (Villenaa, Revillaa, & Thomas Y. Choi, 2011); and training their teams 
during site visits (Modi  & Mabert, 2007), help in motivating their cooperative behaviour and 
creativity (Villenaa et al., 2011). Other studies suggested that supplier incentives can be a 
“double-edged sword” in OI relationships (Gilliland & Kim, 2014). Despite these contrasting 
studies, the innovation management literature has given limited attention to the interplay 
between supplier joint actions and antecedents of dyadic performance, such as the supplier’s 
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asset specificity and goal compatibility (Johnson & Medcof, 2007; Shepherd & DeTienne, 
2005; Stump & Heide, 1996). Moreover, studies of buyer-supplier collaboration remain 
generally silent about the effectiveness of supplier joint actions in enhancing supplier 
performance (Gilliland & Kim, 2014). The purpose of this study is to address these gaps.  
Our study intends to contribute to the SMEs and the OI research and practice by 
conceptualising and examining OI in SMEs from the theoretical perspective of the relational 
view (Dyer & Singh, 1998). An important contribution of this study is the identification of 
supplier's asset specificity and goal compatibility as essential antecedents of supplier’s 
complementarity in SMEs’ OI relationships. Our empirical investigation provides evidence to 
support the theory that the supplier’s contributions through relationship-specific assets and OI 
partners’ goal compatibility are contingencies under which supplier’s complementary 
capabilities improve OI performance. Additionally, we reveal that despite their incentivising 
nature, supplier joint actions can have negative effects on tapping interfirm synergies in SMEs’ 
OI relationships.      
2. Theory and hypotheses 
2.1 Offshoring innovation in SMEs: The buyer-supplier alliance perspective 
 
Extant literature has documented that OI is not a recent phenomenon; instead, it goes back to 
1930s when large American and European firms relocated some of their R&D activities abroad 
(Ambos & Ambos, 2011). Moreover, captive offshoring innovation dominated the early years 
of OI (Lewin et al., 2009). However, Hagedoorn (2002) showed that since early 1980s 
companies seem to increasingly prefer contractual partnerships for innovation over joint 
ventures. Consequently, the strong trend toward OI has been gaining momentum since the early 
2000s (Bertrand & Mol, 2013; Lewin et al., 2009; Musteen & Ahsan, 2013). OI is driven by 
firms’ attempts to tap into the offshore suppliers’ technological resources and the foreign 
markets for specialised talents (Lewin et al., 2009; Quinn, 2000). Also, firms are increasingly 
realising that OI can be a faster, cost-effective and low risk way to innovation and sustained 
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competitive advantage (Gusenbauer et al., 2015; Jean, Sinkovics, & Hiebaum, 2014; Quinn, 
2000; Sartor & Beamish, 2014). 
Previous studies have also documented a growing shift in SMEs’ innovation strategies 
towards adopting OI practices through buyer-supplier relationships (Gassmann, Enkel, & 
Chesbrough, 2010; Lewin et al., 2009; Musteen & Ahsan, 2013; Rothwell & Dodgson, 1991). 
For example, Di Gregorio, Musteen, and Thomas (2009) concluded that offshoring technical 
services are enhancing SMEs’ international competitiveness through opportunities to tap into 
talent pools of foreign suppliers. Musteen and Ahsan (2013) found that through OI, SMEs 
overcome human, social and organizational capital deficiencies and improve their innovation 
performance. Another study by Rodriguez and Nieto (2016) concluded that Offshoring R&D 
stimulates higher sales growth for SMEs than domestic R&D outsourcing. .  
OI is one variant of buyer-supplier relationships with a distinct emphasis on the transfer 
of part or all internal innovation tasks to an offshore supplier (Gusenbauer et al., 2015; 
Spithoven & Teirlinck, 2015). Moreover, OI relationships with offshore suppliers enable buyer 
SMEs to reduce risks of innovations, enhance product quality, and increase new products’ 
speed to market (Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007; Whitley & Willcocks, 2011). However, OI is 
distinct from traditional offshoring of non-core activities (e.g. offshoring production). First, 
there is a higher level of loss of control since it involves sharing of specific tacit knowledge 
(Frishammar, Ericsson, & Patel, 2015; Hoecht & Trott, 2006). Second, firms pursuing 
innovation through offshoring must develop inter-organisational capabilities to integrate 
suppliers’ tacit knowledge and valuable resources (Enderwick & Buckley, 2017; Gooroochurn 
& Hanley, 2007; Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). On the contrary, in typical offshoring of non-
core tasks, the emphasis is on disintegration, and cost savings. Third, OI  requires the 
development of interdependent relationships through strategic collaboration, while the 
offshoring of non-core tasks focuses on labour distribution (I. J. Chen & Paulraj, 2004; 
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Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). To that end, OI requires substantial coordination efforts to 
facilitate the achievement of desired innovation outcomes (Jap, 1999; Nietoa & Santamaria, 
2007; Palmie et al., 2016).  
 The strategic alliance research, argues that firms pursuing innovation through offshore 
outsourcing are usually motivated by survivability and profitability considerations that are 
stronger than transaction cost economics (TCE) (Dussauge et al., 2000; Gooroochurn & 
Hanley, 2007; Teece, 1986).  Specifically,  firms adopting OI as a “buy” innovation strategy, 
lose the advantages of  organisational control of the “make” innovation strategies (Stanko & 
Calantone, 2011; Teece, 1986); consequently, OI shifts the organisation behaviour and 
coordination mechanisms of innovation from the firm to the dyad (I. J. Chen & Paulraj, 2004). 
This conceptualisation of OI comprises various joint activities in a coordinated effort to create 
superior value for buyers . Therefore in conceptualising OI, we follow the perspective of the 
relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998). The central thesis of the relational view asserts that firms 
in dyadic alliances can accumulate relational rents by accessing and combining each other’s 
complementary idiosyncratic capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Therefore, OI, by definition, 
fosters joint innovation through bundling the offshore suppliers' specialised resources and tacit 
knowledge with the buyers’ complementary internal resources (Enderwick & Buckley, 2017; 
Spithoven & Teirlinck, 2015). OI allows the buyer SMEs to benefit from utilising 
heterogeneous and immobile resources of the offshore suppliers under the dyad’s relaxed 
conditions of resource proprietary and imperfect mobility (Lavie, 2006; Van Beers & Zand, 
2014). 
2.2 Supplier’s complementary capabilities  
 
In this study, we refer to the supplier’s complementary capabilities as the degree to which the 
SME buyer and the offshore supplier can combine the supplier’s distinct capabilities to jointly 
produce performance outcomes that are not achievable by either of the two acting individually 
Offshoring Innovation in SMEs 
9 
 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Sarkar et al., 2001). Consequently, supplier’s 
complementary capability can be a source of relational value for SME buyers in OI 
relationships (Dyer and Singh 1998). For the purpose of our study, resources and capabilities 
are interchangeable. However, we deliberately highlight capabilities to incorporate a dynamic 
perspective in our analysis of OI relationships. A dynamic view seems more appropriate to 
understand how supplier’s complementary capabilities combine not only supplier’s distinctive 
attributes but also the SME-offshore supplier interactions to co-create super-additive value in 
OI (Mudambi & Tallman, 2010; Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007). Besides, given their limited 
resources, SMEs are required to integrate the technological advances of their suppliers into 
their products (Fernández-Olmos & Ramírez-Alesón, 2017). Therefore, when SMEs fail to 
generate strategic competitive advantage because of their limited capabilities, supplier’s 
complementary capabilities facilitate complex interfirm combination of the offshore supplier 
superior capabilities with the SMEs’ weaker capabilities (Cobena et al., 2017; Mitsuhashi & 
Greve, 2009; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; von Haartman & Bengtsson, 2015).  
 While the strategic interfirm literature documents that supplier’s complementary 
capabilities can be a source of OI viability and success, SMEs in dyadic OI relationships must 
be aware of the challenges they might face while pursuing relational gains from adding up 
supplier’s  complementary capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jap, 1999; Lavie, 2006; Sivadas 
& Dwyer, 2000). First, the SMEs must assess the potential complementarity of the offshore 
supplier before they make the supplier selection decision (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Second, the 
SMEs must build inter-organisational skills to permit the appropriation of synergetic value 
when accessing the supplier’s complementary capabilities (Lavie, 2006; Sivadas & Dwyer, 
2000). These challenges are substantial in the case of SMEs due to their limited experience in 
foreign markets, imperfect resources to invest in search and evaluation of potential offshore 
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suppliers, and their weaker position compared to large firms in global supply chain networks 
(Pawar, Huq, Khraishi, & Shah, 2018). 
In the following subsections, we explain the reasons why the supplier's asset specificity 
and goal compatibility enhance supplier’s complementary capabilities, and how the supplier’s 
complementary capabilities then affect the performance of OI for SMEs. Further, we develop 
our proposed model of supplier’s complementary capabilities in SMEs’ OI relationships 
(Figure 1). 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.2.1 Supplier’s asset specificity and supplier’s complementary capabilities.  
Supplier's asset specificity refers to the investments made to match the buyer’s specific 
requirements  at the actual site, or in physical and human capabilities (e.g. installation of new 
design software, or updating of existing production equipment with the latest technology) 
(Joshi & Stump, 1999). Such investments can be a viable route to enhance supplier’s 
complementary capabilities and lead to competitive interfirm performance (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Lavie, 2006). Specifically, supplier’s asset specificity overcomes shortages in buyers’ 
resources by offering distinct capabilities (Teece, 1986). Previous studies document that 
supplier’s asset specificity fosters partners’ interdependence and hence cultivate dyadic 
complementarities (Dussauge et al., 2000; Dyer, 1996; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). For 
example, Dyer (1996) concluded that suppliers' specific investments in the auto industry are 
more likely to result in competitive advantage for automakers, particularly when tasks involved 
are characterised by a high degree of interdependence, such as collaborative innovation (Dyer, 
1996). Similarly, Rothaermel and Boeker (2008) found that specialised niches of 
biotechnology firms often lead to complementary effects when combined with pharmaceutical 
firms' competences in administrative management, marketing, and distribution activities.    
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Supplier's asset specificity also entails assets' heterogeneity and immobility which are 
primary conditions for complementarity (Cobena et al., 2017; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 
2006). For example in the context of OI, Mudambi and Tallman (2010) argued that decisions 
of offshoring knowledge tasks are usually encouraged by accessing specialised suppliers' 
capabilities in offshore markets and combining them with outsourcers own capabilities. 
Furthermore, offshore suppliers often deploy specific investments because of their role as the 
international provider in the OI buyer-supplier relationships (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Stump & 
Heide, 1996). However, relationship-specific assets expose offshore suppliers to the risk of 
buyers' opportunism. Therefore, offshore suppliers might shirk their future investments unless 
their buyers are willing to swap mutual hostages in return (Anderson & Jap, 2005; Poppo, 
Zhou, & Zenger, 2008; Stump & Heide, 1996).  
In case of SMEs, where OI is primarily motivated by shortages in internal resources, 
finding heterogeneous offshore suppliers who are willing to invest in new assets is highly 
relevant to achieving complementarity (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009). Also, the supplier's asset 
specificity signals the offshore supplier's commitment to intentionally invest in the relationship 
, and mobilise specialised capabilities for the alliance's benefit (Lavie, 2006). Finally, supplier's 
asset specificity prompts supplier’s complementary capabilities to play the role of an effective 
governance mechanism in international buyer-supplier relationships over and above the usual 
contractual agreements (Bunyaratavej, Hahn, & Doh, 2007). Such a role facilitates a 
cooperative climate where the SME expects that the offshore supplier will share its specialised 
assets to enhance OI performance (Koufteros et al., 2012). Likewise, the offshore supplier 
expects his share of the benefit (e.g. promises of future orders) gained from the operationalised 
dyadic complementarity (Joshi & Stump, 1999; Koufteros et al., 2012; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 
2009). Applying this rationale to supplier’s asset specificity in SMEs’ OI relationships, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis (H1). Supplier’s asset specificity is positively related to the supplier’s 
complementary capabilities in SMEs’ OI relationships. 
2.2.2 Goal compatibility and supplier’s complementary capabilities.  
Goal compatibility refers to the extent to which the goals and objectives of the SME buyer are 
aligned with the goals and objectives of the offshore supplier (Werder, 2005). For example, 
goal compatibility in OI buyer-supplier relationships can be perceived as the possibility of 
accomplishment of joint innovation creation (Jap, 1999; Sarkar et al., 2001). Additionally, goal 
compatibility in OI can be a shared vision that represents collective goals of partners (Wang et 
al., 2016). Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that finding a supplier with complementary capabilities 
creates a potential for relational rents. However, such rents can be realised only if both parties 
have compatible goals that motivate them to consolidate supplier’s complementary 
capabilities. For example, Wang et al. (2016) studied 323 dyadic new product co-development 
(NPD) relationships in China and found that the more compatible the goals of the parties in 
these relationships, the more able were they to achieve complementary interfirm rents. 
According to Wang et al. (2016)’s study, compatible goals help partners to recognise their 
interdependence in NPD projects and consequently facilitate effective cooperation to achieve 
collaborative outcomes.  
Also, from an organisation’s internal perspective, innovation teams are usually goal 
driven (Stanko & Calantone, 2011). For example, internal R&D teams typically have a 
common goal, and all individuals within that team behave in line with this goal (Forsgren, 
2002). Therefore, the innovation process emerges as a purposeful, adaptive and constructive 
process, resulting from the interaction between outcomes and goals (Poole & Van de Ven, 
1995). The same contention can apply at the inter-organisational level, where interconnected 
organisations can act as a single collective entity to achieve desired outcomes if they have 
compatible goals (Poole & Van de Ven, 1995). On the other hand, since SMEs might not be 
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able to develop the supplier’s complementary capabilities internally, goal compatibility is an 
attractive mechanism that ensures tapping potential rents of the offshore suppliers’ 
complementary capabilities (Lavie, 2006). Moreover, SME entrepreneurs make good use of 
goal compatibility as a motivational tool to form interdependencies, engender flexibility, and 
drive both parties’ contributions (Julien, 1993; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Rothaermel & 
Boeker, 2008). Contrarily, goal incompatibility between partners can impair collaboration, 
since it frustrates partners who become suspicious of each other's opportunistic behaviour (Jap, 
1999; Wang et al., 2016). Therefore, the strategic alliance research suggests that partners with 
competing goals should not enter into dyadic relationships, as such relationships are doomed 
to fail (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jap, 1999). Following this discussion, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis (H2). Goal compatibility is positively related to the supplier’s complementary 
capabilities in SMEs’ OI relationships. 
2.2.3 Supplier’s complementary capabilities and OI performance.  
The alliance literature established that relational rents are high in alliances between partners 
possessing complementary capabilities (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006; Sivadas & Dwyer, 
2000).  Previous OI  studies have shown that the supplier’s complementary capabilities is a 
relational antecedent of OI performance, and a primary driver of OI decision (Nietoa & 
Santamaria, 2007; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Moreover, recent studies noted that supplier’s 
complementary capabilities in dyadic alliances predict alliance formation and success (Cobena 
et al., 2017; Mindruta et al., 2016; Van Beers & Zand, 2014).  
In OI, supplier’s complementary capabilities arise when the combination of different 
types of technological knowledge, R&D processes, or innovation commercialization 
capabilities of both partners lead to enhanced product and process innovations of the buyer’s 
firm  (Cobena et al., 2017; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Van Beers & Zand, 2014). For example, 
offshore suppliers can provide technological knowledge for production process innovations of 
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SMEs (Van Beers & Zand, 2014). Also, offshore suppliers might be members of specialised 
clusters with access to creative workforce (Lewin et al., 2009). Furthermore, SMEs can 
leverage offshore suppliers’ core strengths in R&D, engineering and production technologies 
in areas where they have deficiencies (Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007; Rothaermel & Boeker, 
2008; Van Beers & Zand, 2014). Accordingly, supplier’s complementary capabilities may 
foster new learning opportunities for SMEs through collaboration with offshore suppliers who 
have a broader knowledge base about new technologies and markets than SMEs (Koufteros et 
al., 2012; Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007; Van Beers & Zand, 2014). Summing up, the supplier’s 
complementary capabilities facilitate a feasible OI route for SMEs to achieve a superior 
innovation performance at the competitive cost in offshore markets (Cobena et al., 2017; 
Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008). Therefore, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis (H3). The supplier’s complementary capabilities are positively related to SMEs’ 
OI performance. 
2.2.4 The mediation role of the supplier’s complementary capabilities.  
So far, we argued that the supplier’s asset specificity and the partners’ goal compatibility 
nurture supplier’s complementary capabilities, which, in turn, become critical determinants of 
potential relational rents for SMEs in OI relationships. These arguments mean that supplier’s 
complementary capabilities may also play a mediatory role in the relationship between 
relational antecedents and performance of OI relationships (Cobena et al., 2017; Mitsuhashi & 
Greve, 2009). The strategic alliance and supply chain literatures established that interfirm 
diversity due to idiosyncratic investments as well as social and cultural similarities affects the 
alliance performance (Dyer, 1996; Jap, 1999; Jean, Kim, & Bello, 2017; Sarkar et al., 2001). 
Both factors can reinforce the importance of supplier’s complementary capabilities. For 
instance, supplier’s asset specificity is an efficient way for a supplier to signal to the buyer its 
attractiveness as a potential collaborative partner, and, in doing so, the supplier is better 
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positioned to explain the potential value of its own complementary capabilities (Nietoa & 
Santamaria, 2007; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Van Beers & Zand, 2014). Also, partners’ 
collective goals as well as shared vision to achieve joint innovation outcomes can further foster 
a conducive climate of interfirm complementarity (Wang et al., 2016). Further, supplier’s asset 
specificity and goal compatibility are envisioned to act as valid proxies for supplier’s 
complementary capabilities (Cobena et al., 2017; Jap, 1999; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009; Sarkar 
et al., 2001).  
Also, supplier’s complementary capabilities can serve as an effective medium to 
transmit the economic effects of supplier's asset specificity and the social bonding effect of 
goal compatibility to OI performance (Cobena et al., 2017; Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2009). In 
summary, supplier’s complementary capabilities create added value through the combination 
of the offshore supplier idiosyncratic capabilities and the buyer-supplier interactions. 
Specifically, SMEs benefit from this mediatory role of supplier’s complementary capabilities 
in accruing relational rent from suppliers’ capabilities which the SMEs do not own or control 
(Enderwick & Buckley, 2017; Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). Furthermore, given distant 
offshore relations, SMEs can utilise supplier's asset specificity and goal compatibility as 
relatively less expensive control mechanisms than, for example, face to face meetings. 
Therefore, we hypothesise: 
Hypothesis (H4a). The supplier’s complementary capabilities will mediate the positive 
relationship between the supplier's asset specificity and OI performance. 
Hypothesis (H4b). The supplier’s complementary capabilities will mediate the positive 
relationship between goal compatibility and OI performance. 
2.3 The Moderating effects of supplier joint actions.  
Although supplier's asset specificity and goal compatibility in OI relationships are critical 
drivers of performance and success, they are potentially significant sources of risks (Flynn, 
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Hou, & Zhao, 2010; Jap, 1999; Joshi & Stump, 1999; Mudambi & Tallman, 2010; Nyaga, 
Whipple, & Lynch, 2010; Rothaermel & Boeker, 2008; Wang et al., 2016). For example, 
suppliers who invested heavily in relationship-specific assets are subject to substantial lock-in 
risks in case of buyers switching to other suppliers (Liu, Huang, Luo, & Zhao, 2012). 
Moreover, compatible goals often suffer from multiple and conflicting interpretations in 
interfirm relationships across borders and among different teams and organisations (L. H. 
Chen, Ellis, & Suresh, 2016; Gilliland & Kim, 2014; Kim, Choi, & Skilton, 2015). 
Previous studies have proposed that supplier joint actions aimed at supplier 
development are critical drivers of collaborative success (Flynn et al., 2010; Huq, Stevenson, 
& Zorzini, 2014; Nyaga et al., 2010). These include working with the supplier to reduce costs, 
improve quality, and train personnel. Supplier joint actions can act as effective incentives to 
focus the supplier’s efforts on the mutual benefits of superior exchange performance (Heide & 
John, 1990; Joshi & Stump, 1999). In addition, supplier joint actions not only encourage 
cooperative behaviour through “working together” to resolve disputes and coordinate 
collaborative activities (Nyaga et al., 2010), but also act as a non-contractual control 
mechanism to deter opportunism (Joshi & Stump, 1999; Liu et al., 2012; Nyaga et al., 2010).  
Despite their limited financial resources to engage in vast and expensive supplier 
development programs like the ones Toyota implements with their suppliers (Lawson, Krause, 
& Potter, 2015), SMEs can still benefit from the incentivising nature of low scale supplier joint 
actions to ensure the supplier’s dedicated efforts and contributions towards enhancing the OI 
performance (Lui, Ghauri, & Sinkovics, 2010; Mooi & Ghosh, 2010). For example,  SMEs can 
help the offshore supplier to improve the utilisation and productivity of its specific assets 
through the use of information and communication technology (ICT)’s electronic linkages to 
exchange information with the offshore supplier instead of prolonged site visits (Zhang, Dirk 
Pieter Van Donk, & van der Vaart, 2016). Consequently such inexpensive supplier joint actions 
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can unleash for SMEs relational benefits from supplier’s specific asset (Johnson & Medcof, 
2007; Nyaga et al., 2010; Shepherd & DeTienne, 2005; Sumo, van der Valk, van Weele, & 
Bode, 2016). This means that supplier joint actions enable SMEs to tap better into supplier's 
asset specificity.  In contrast, in the absence of such incentivising activities, suppliers are likely 
to fear the SMEs' opportunistic behaviour and consequently provide less than expected 
performance (Mooi & Ghosh, 2010).   
Similarly, as supplier joint actions in OI become increasingly oriented towards securing 
economic gains for the offshore supplier, such interactions will positively moderate the impact 
of compatible goals on OI performance (Lui et al., 2010). For example, working jointly with 
the supplier’s innovation team during joint training programs, and frequent technical meetings 
though ICT linkages, will facilitate the offshore supplier alignment with the OI objectives and 
consequently enhances the effect of goal compatibility on OI performance (Jane, Kim, & 
Sinkovics, 2012; Kulangara, Jackson, & Prater, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). Besides, through 
supplier joint actions, parties in OI relationships value shared goals and hence can derive higher 
relational rents (Liu et al., 2012). Consequently, through supplier joint action, SMEs increase 
the possibility of benefiting from goal compatibility in drawing better OI performance. In 
contrast, the lack of supplier joint actions will challenge the quality of shared social capital in 
OI relationships and hinder the chances of the continuation and success of the OI relationship 
(Jean et al., 2017; Lui et al., 2010).  This discussion suggests the study’s final two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis (H5a). Supplier joint actions positively moderate the relationship between the 
supplier’s asset specificity and OI performance.  
Hypothesis (H5a). Supplier joint actions positively moderate the relationship between goal 
compatibility and OI performance.  
3. Methodology  
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3.1. Sampling and data collection 
This study is part of a broader research that investigates OI relationships in SMEs, drawing 
from a data set of 200 developed country European SME manufacturers with active OI 
relationships. We specifically choose OI in a buyer-supplier context. Offshore outsourcing 
relationships has been researched extensively as forms of fruitful interfirm cooperation 
(Bunyaratavej et al., 2007; Maskell, Pedersen, Petersen, & Dick‐Nielsen, 2007). Accordingly, 
they offer an excellent opportunity to draw useful insights for research and practice in case of 
pursuing innovation through offshore outsourcing. Moreover, buyer-supplier or non-equity OI 
relationships can be more attractive to SMEs than captive relationships given their limited 
resources (Rodriguez & Nieto, 2016). Furthermore, previous studies argued that non-equity 
offshoring relationships adapt better than equity arrangements (Buvik & John, 2000) as they 
assist buyers to share with suppliers risks of innovations (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989), and 
move quickly into new markets and technologies (Quinn, 2000). 
 According to the European economic data, the SMEs manufacturing sector in Europe 
included more than 2 million firms and produced €725 billion or 44.5% of the manufacturing 
sector value added in 2013 (Eurostat, 2016). Furthermore, in 2014, SMEs contributed 26.3% 
to the manufacturing sector value added in Germany, and from 10.5-14.5% in Italy, UK and 
France (Eurostat, 2017). Additionally, the European innovation data reported that 49.1% of all 
European SMEs had reported some form of innovation activity between 2012 and 2014 
(Eurostat, 2017). For data collection, we used an online cross-sectional survey in line with 
previous studies with similar context (e.g. van de Vrande et al. (2009). Our initial sampling 
frame included 2,384 firms. The survey targeted manufacturing SMEs from four developed 
European countries; Germany, Italy, UK and France with an existing OI relationship with a 
supplier located in a country different than the country of the SME (Bunyaratavej et al., 2007; 
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Geishecker & Görg, 2013; Maskell et al., 2007). More than 50% of the supplier firms in our 
sample were in a different continent than Europe.  
We screened out a total of 1,466 firms from the initial sample since they did not meet 
the SME size criteria or the study criteria for a buyer-supplier OI governance mode. The final 
sample size was 918 firms. All the SMEs in our sample fulfilled the EU definition of SMEs – 
i.e. each has  a total number of employees between 10-249 and an annual turnover of more than 
€2 to €50 million (European Commission, 2016). We excluded SMEs with captive OI since 
the primary goal of the research is to investigate OI in a buyer-supplier context. Moreover, the 
buyer-supplier context is more relevant to SMEs given their resource constraints, and their 
high-risk exposure of foreign direct investments (FDIs) compared to large firms (Gusenbauer 
et al., 2015; Rodriguez & Nieto, 2016). 
To ensure complete responses, we activated the forced response option for all questions. 
Also, to encourage high-quality responses, we added an attention check midway through the 
survey to make sure that respondents are paying adequate attention. Further, we screened out 
all responses with a completion time less than 1/3 of the median time of all completed 
responses. After screening out incomplete responses and responses that failed quality checks, 
the final sample contained 200 firms, giving us an effective response rate of 21.8%. We 
surveyed top managers of SMEs. Key informants, especially in case of SMEs, are typically in 
charge of establishing and managing strategic relationships, given the small management 
structure in SMEs and the challenges of managing OI relationships (Bidault & Castello, 2010; 
Gusenbauer et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, surveying top executives (e.g. chief executive officer, managing partner) 
from the buyer side are a commonly adopted practice in supply chain and operations 
management research (Carr & Pearson, 1999; Paulraj, Lado, & Chen, 2008). Our sample came 
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from various manufacturing industries. The industry type of the 200 SME in the data set and 
respondent titles are listed in Table 1.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
3.2. Survey development and measures 
Since our unit of analysis is the offshoring SME with existing OI relationship, we instructed 
the respondents to select a significant offshore supplier with whom they have an active OI 
relationship. Such a mindset helped us to increase the validity of respondents’ views about their 
offshore suppliers. We developed our survey instrument using multiple item measures from 
published research. The study's survey used a 7-point Likert scale with endpoints "1= strongly 
disagree" and "7= strongly agree". Before the commencement of the live data collection, we 
contacted eight manufacturing executives from SMEs spanning Italy, UK, Germany, and 
Spain, and asked them to complete the survey. We contacted them again to request their 
feedback about the questions in the survey, with respect to clarity, length, and coverage for the 
OI investigated topics. The final questionnaire included some modifications based on the 
comments we received from the manufacturing executives of the SMEs.  
 To measure “supplier’s asset specificity”  we used four items from Joshi and Stump 
(1999). The items measured the extent to which the offshored innovation tasks needed highly 
specified human and physical resources. Additionally, this construct also captured the extent 
to which the offshore supplier has made dedicated and specialised investments for the OI 
relationship, has tailored its product and process development programs to match the SME 
buyer requirements, and has committed specialized skills in training the SME buyer people. To 
measure “goal compatibility”, we used three items from Jap (1999) and Wang et al. (2016). 
The items measured the extent to which the SME and the offshore supplier have compatible 
goals, support each other's objectives, and share the same goals in the relationship. To measure 
“supplier’s complementary capabilities” we applied four items which assess the extent to which 
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the offshore supplier contributes different capabilities to the OI relationship, has 
complementary strengths. In addition to the degree to which the offshore supplier has separate 
abilities when combined with the SME’s abilities enable the SME to achieve goals beyond its 
reach independently, and whether the joint R&D efforts benefit from their closeness to both 
firms’ current products and processes (Jap, 1999; Sivadas & Dwyer, 2000). To measure 
“supplier joint actions” we used a three-item scale to assess the extent to which the offshoring 
SME is working with the offshore supplier to reduce its costs, improve its quality, and train its 
people (Joshi & Stump, 1999). Finally, we operationalised OI performance using a four-item 
scale, measuring OI performance concerning new or enhanced products and processes, new 
product speed to market, and rate of patent applications (Jane et al., 2012; Rindfleisch & 
Moorman, 2001; Roy & Sivakumar, 2011). 
3.3. Data analysis 
3.3.1. Common method bias. Since we collected data from a single informant within each SME 
in our sample, common method variance is of concern. To address this concern, we conducted 
two tests. First, we conducted the Harman's one-factor test (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003). According to this test, if a substantial amount of common method variance 
is present, then either (1) a single factor will emerge from the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
of all survey items, or (2) one general factor will account for most of the variance in the data 
set. In our case, the un-rotated principal component EFA based on Eigenvalue greater than one, 
revealed the presence of four distinct factors with Eigenvalue greater than one. The four factors 
together accounted for 64.36% of the variance. Further, the first factor accounted for 39.41% 
of the variance. Second, we ran a single factor confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) test. The 
model fit indices for the single factor CFA model conveyed a comparative fit index (CFI) = 
0.751, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = 0.710, and root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) = 0.128. All CFA model fit indices were significantly worse than our measurement 
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model (as shown in Appendix A). Based on these two tests, we can conclude that common 
method bias might not be a concern in our dataset (Sanchez & Brock, 1996). Furthermore, Kull, 
Kotlar, and Spring (2018) argued that the effect of a single-key respondent in SMEs research 
is not very problematic since the small management structure can help to capture a broader 
picture of what is happening in SMEs.    
3.3.2. Confirmatory factor analysis.  
To investigate the unidimensionality, reliability, and validity of the theoretical constructs, we 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). One of the loadings within each of the study 
constructs was constrained to a value of one, and an estimation output using maximum 
likelihood was generated with standardised estimates, residual moments and modification 
indices. The hypothesised measurement model fit of data was satisfactory with values for 
model fit indices - normed X² = 1.99 (≤2.0), p<0.001, CFI = 0.934, TLI =0.911; standardised 
root mean square residuals (SRMR) = 0.053; and RMSEA = 0.071. We note that during the 
CFA process, we dropped one item each from supplier’s asset specificity, supplier’s 
complementary capabilities and OI scales to improve model fitting.  
To establish discriminant validity, we compared the squared correlation between every 
two constructs in our model with their average variance extracted (AVE) values (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). Examining the correlation coefficients given in Table 2 with the AVE values 
shown in Appendix A, we can conclude that none of the squared correlations is higher than the 
AVE of both the underlying constructs. The highest squared correlation of 0.403 between 
supplier’s asset specificity and OI performance was lower than the AVE for the two constructs 
0.48 and 0.50, respectively. These results provide evidence of discriminant validity among 
proposed theoretical constructs. The descriptive statistics of the constructs and their 
correlations are shown in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
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 To evaluate the reliability of the study’s constructs, we calculated the composite 
reliability (CR) for all constructs. Results showed that all constructs had a CR value of greater 
than or equal to 0.70, confirming that items within each construct accounted for more variance 
than the variance explained by the error components; therefore, items are significantly related 
to their theoretical constructs (Bagozzi & Yi, 2012). Reliability of the constructs was 
established using internal consistency method via Cronbach’s alpha. All constructs showed 
Cronbach’s alpha value of greater than 0.70. Also, the AVE values (Appendix A) are more than 
or equal to 0.5 for all constructs, except supplier’s asset specificity and supplier’s 
complementary capabilities, whose AVE value is 0.48. Adequate convergent validity is 
therefore exhibited (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
4. Results 
4.1. Hypotheses testing 
Since our hypothesised model (see Figure 1) involves mediation and moderation hypotheses 
with one mediator, one moderator, and two independent variables, we used models 4 & 5 
illustrated in Preacher and Hayes (2008). Hayes's Process v3.0 tool tests mediation and 
moderation hypotheses using bootstrapping, a computer-intensive resampling from the data set 
for thousands of times (e.g. 5000) to build confidence interval of the empirical estimation of 
the mediation and interaction effects between variables (Lockwood & MacKinnon, 1998). For 
our analysis, we used 5000 resampling iterations and a 95% confidence interval for the 
approximation of the indirect effect.   
 Table 3 lists result from these tests. Table 3 also includes Sobel’s test as a second test 
for mediation effects.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
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  As shown in Table 3, the direct paths from supplier’s asset specificity (b=0.403, 
t=7.020, p<0.001) and goal compatibility (b=0.351, t=6.310, p<0.001) to the supplier’s 
complementary capabilities, were positive and statistically significant. Also, the path from the 
supplier’s complementary capabilities to OI performance (b=0.192, t=2.536, p<0.01) is 
positive and statistically significant. These results support our hypothesis H1, H2 and H3. 
Furthermore, as shown in Table 3 the total effect of supplier’s asset specificity (b=0.555, 
t=8.977, p<0.001) and goal compatibility (b=0.169, t=2.778, p<0.01) on OI performance is 
positive and significant. This result is consistent with the proposed mediation effect in our 
conceptual model (Preacher & Hayes, 2008).  
To study the mediation effects further, we compare the results shown in Table 3 
between the total effects of supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility on OI 
performance before and after we introduced supplier’s complementary capabilities. The 
comparison shows that the effect of supplier's asset specificity on OI performance (b=0.555, 
t=8.977, p<0.001) weakened (b=0.478, t=7.004, p<0.001). Likewise, the effect of goal 
compatibility on OI performance became insignificant (b=0.099, t=1.592, p=0.128). In 
summary, the results support the partial mediation of the supplier's asset specificity and full 
mediation of goal compatibility (H4a, H4b). Despite the robustness of Hayes's Process v3.0 
tool approach in testing mediation hypotheses. We conducted Sobel test (Sobel, 1982, 1986) 
as a second approach to re-confirm the proposed mediation effect of supplier’s complementary 
capabilities. Sobel’s approach involves computing the ratio of the indirect effect to its estimated 
standard error. As shown in Table 3, Sobel test results support mediation of supplier’s asset 
specificity (z=2.352, p<0.05), and goal compatibility (z=2.384, p<0.05), due to the introduction 
of supplier’s complementary capabilities. 
 Contrary to our hypotheses H5a and H5b , our results do not provide support for the 
positive moderation effect of supplier rewarding joint action on the relationship between 
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supplier's asset specificity and OI performance (b=-0.053, t=-1.381, p=0.17) or between goal 
compatibility and OI performance (b=-0.021, t=-0.687, p=.49). Instead, we found insignificant 
negative effects. 
5. Discussion  
 
Despite the broad scholarly consensus that supplier’s complementarity in OI relationships is a 
determinant for collaboration and success, most of the empirical studies focused on studying 
the role of suppliers’ complementarities in OI in the context of large firms. In this study, we 
extended the relational view (Dyer & Singh, 1998) to the context of OI, and conducted a survey 
directly among SMEs. Our findings highlight the relevance of supplier’s asset specificity and 
goal compatibility while assessing suppliers’ complementarity in OI relationships. We 
empirically examined the performance effects of the antecedents and outcomes of supplier’s 
complementary capabilities within the context of OI by SMEs. We affirmed that supplier’s 
complementary capabilities are significantly related to OI performance. This finding, though 
consistent with the strategic-relational literature (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Lavie, 2006), 
contradicts the TCE’s traditions which postulate that firms will collaborate to acquire access to 
the supplier’s complementary capabilities when the risks of collaboration are not too high 
(Nietoa & Santamaria, 2007). 
 It is important to note that although the application and effectiveness of supplier’s asset 
specificity and goal compatibility in fostering supplier’s complementary capabilities are not 
limited to SMEs only, they are more in line with the SME entrepreneurs' interpersonal and 
relational competencies. Both are less expensive to measure, monitor and sufficient to incite 
the entrepreneurial mindset and the less risk averse behaviours of SMEs (Ferreira, Coelho, & 
Moutinho, 2018; Julien, 1993). Consequently, our empirical evidence offers supplier’s asset 
specificity and goal computability as essential relational mechanisms for SMEs to assess and 
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leverage supplier’s complementarity in achieving sustained collaborative advantages in OI 
relationships. 
 Our results confirm that SMEs might rely on supplier’s asset specificity and goal 
compatibility to identify suppliers’ strategic complementarity. Also, the supplier's asset 
specificity and goal compatibility can act as alternative mechanisms to long partnering 
experience and rigorous suppliers’ search. This finding extends previous literature which 
predicted that supplier’s specialised investments prove to be an effective tool in the cultivation 
of alliances’ complementary capabilities (Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). Such investments 
reflect the supplier's voluntary commitment to fulfil an SME’s specific requirements from the 
OI relationhsip (Lavie, 2006; Sarkar et al., 2001). Additionally, while the supplier's asset 
specificity is instrumental in building the physical context of the supplier’s complementary 
capabilities, goal compatibility weaves the social context of the supplier’s complementary 
capabilities in OI relationships. Goal compatibility can reduce partners' fears of opportunism 
and compel them to focus on achieving relational outcomes (De Vita et al., 2010; Jean et al., 
2017; Mudambi & Tallman, 2010). Besides, goal compatibility increases the predictive power 
of interfirm complementarity in OI relationships not only due to its collaborative motivational 
dimension (Jap, 1999; Sarkar et al., 2001; Wang et al., 2016); but also due to its ability to blur 
firms’ boundaries and galvanize innovation teams at both sides as one internal team.  
 It appears that under high supplier’s asset specificity and high goal compatibility,  
SMEs can value and exploit the supplier’s complementary capabilities in OI despite a 
significant risk of sensitive knowledge spill over and loss of competitive advantage (Aubert, 
Kishore, & Iriyama, 2015; Gooroochurn & Hanley, 2007; Hoecht & Trott, 2006). Our 
empirical findings are in line with Lewin et al. (2009), who argue that access to qualified 
personnel, speed to market and cost savings are strong determinants of OI decisions. Moreover, 
our findings are also in keeping with Bertrand and Mol (2013), who concluded that benefits 
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from accessing a broader range of innovation capabilities in OI outweighs looming risks, 
especially when compared with cost and risks of internal alternatives.    
 Our results show that the relationship between supplier’s asset specificity with OI 
performance is partially explained through supplier’s complementary capabilities. This finding 
suggests that the offshore supplier’s contributions in the form of specific investments may exert 
a direct effect on OI performance. Also, supplier’s specific investments – most likely to be 
specialised in case of OI in SMEs - foster building supplier’s complementary capabilities, 
which in turn, affect OI performance (Enderwick & Buckley, 2017). Therefore, both the direct 
and indirect effect of supplier’s asset specificity confirm the competitive edge of differentiated 
supplier’s investments in facilitating stronger performance in OI. Accordingly, supplier’s asset 
specificity works on its own as well as through the development of supplier’s complementary 
capabilities.  
 Findings from our research show that the relationship between goal compatibility and 
OI performance appears to occur mostly through supplier’s complementary capabilities. This 
result extends the strategic-relational research which consistently finds that social similarities 
such as goal compatibility are fundamental elements in fostering successful collaborative 
relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Jap, 1999; Joshi & Stump, 1999). For SME entrepreneurs, 
goal compatibility acts as an informal control mechanism for maintaining a collaborative 
climate that is conducive to superior OI performance (Bougrain & Haudeville, 2002; Wang et 
al., 2016).  
 Interestingly, contrary to our hypotheses H5a and H5b, our results do not support the 
positive moderating effects of supplier joint actions. We advanced our propositions following 
theoretical underpinnings that a collaborative relationship with joint activities builds trust 
between partners by providing assurances of nonopportunistic behaviour, allowing them to 
focus on the mutual benefits of superior interfirm performance (Heide & John, 1990; Joshi & 
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Stump, 1999). Moreover, through supplier joint actions, suppliers receive financial benefits as 
an economic return on their specific investments and the unique adaptations they have made to 
their internal processes (Krause & Scannell, 2002; Modi  & Mabert, 2007; Munjal et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, as a result of supplier joint actions, suppliers perceive buyer firms as “fair” 
partners concerned with the suppliers’ goals and welfare (Liu et al., 2012). However, our results 
did not find the support of these relationships. 
Some of the possible rationalisations for these contradictory finding is: First, despite 
supplier’s potential gains from joint actions, they do not qualify as equal hostages that balance 
supplier’s risks from dedicated and difficult to re-deploy specific assets. For example, 
Anderson and Jap (2005) argued that only mutual specialised and unrecoverable investments 
could ensure that both partners have the same high stakes in the relationship. Second, supplier 
joint actions have no value for an invested supplier once the buyer decides to end the 
relationship. Third, suppliers’ valuation of incentives accrued from joint actions is more 
important than the incentives themselves (Gilliland & Kim, 2014). Therefore, for any incentive 
to motivate OI performance, it needs to be high enough to win the supplier’s compliance and 
commitment in OI relationships (Gilliland & Kim, 2014). Fourth, as incentives, supplier joint 
actions can also be context dependent, hence their power and effectiveness is rather hinged on 
the scope of interfirm cooperation and the odds of continuation or termination of the OI 
relationship (Gilliland & Kim, 2014; Kim et al., 2015; Stump & Heide, 1996).  
6. Conclusions and Implications 
OI differs from typical offshore outsourcing not only when it comes to motives and 
characteristics, but also in the extensive level of dyadic interactions required, which in turn 
affects the outcomes of OI relationships. These differences clearly highlight that the outcome 
of OI depends on how SMEs choose to access and leverage the offshore supplier's 
complementary capabilities. The empirical investigation we carried out in this study provides 
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further evidence that the offshore supplier’s contributions and partners’ goal compatibility are 
contingencies under which supplier’s complementary capabilities could improve OI 
performance. SMEs who apply the supplier's asset specificity and goal compatibility can gain 
more relational rents from OI relationships. Our results confirm that the effect of the supplier’s 
complementarity on OI performance is further explained by the specialised capabilities brought 
by the supplier to the collaboration framework. Also, the positive association of goal 
compatibility with the OI performance appeared to occur largely through dyadic 
complementarity.  
 Our research exposes the downside of SMEs limited resources which undermines their 
abilities to search and select champion offshore suppliers. However, SME managers may apply 
supplier’s asset specificity and goal compatibility as affordable ways to accrue relational rents 
in their OI relationships. Our framework provides SMEs’ managers with a basis for more 
effective management of collaborative OI dyads. For example, selecting offshore suppliers who 
are willing to invest and adapt to meet the SMEs’ goals from OI is highly relevant to achieve 
supplier’s complementarity. Also, OI collaborations can benefit greatly from goal 
compatibility in encouraging the offshore supplier to pursue collective gains.  
 The results of this study call for a deeper understanding of the nature and effect of 
supplier joint actions in OI relationships, especially in case of suppliers with high specific 
investment stakes. In other words, high supplier’s asset specificity may downplay the 
incentivising power of supplier joint actions. Our findings prompt SMEs managers to think 
carefully about incentivising offshore suppliers’ collaboration behaviour via supplier joint 
actions. For example, SMEs must determine what type of supplier joint actions might 
encourage the offshore supplier to collaborate more and subsequently use the appropriate level 
of these actions to drive super relational rents from the OI relationship. Therefore, SME 
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managers should grasp that although supplier joint actions can be effective cooperation tools, 
they may always not work. 
 
6.1. Limitations and future research 
The present study has several limitations that would provide avenues for future research. First, 
we sampled our SMEs from the developed country manufacturers in Germany, Italy, UK, and 
France. It would be interesting to see if our findings are generalizable to different industries 
and geographies including services and SMEs in developing countries. Second, despite the 
verified reliability of our findings, it is noteworthy that we relied on the SME’s perspectives 
and qualifications as a proxy for evaluating dyadic constructs. A direct investigation of the 
offshore suppliers’ perspectives could have enabled us to draw different conclusions (e.g. the 
non-supported moderating effect of supplier joint actions). Also, extending suppliers joint 
activities to include other incentives such as profit sharing or. assigning intellectual property 
rights of collective innovations might have revealed stronger effects of these incentives on OI 
performance. Third, drawing upon the less experienced than large firms position of SMEs in 
OI dyads, an exciting prospect of future research will be to define the minimum resources and 
operational attributes that an offshore supplier must own to qualify as a robust collaborator for 
OI. Other good prospects for future research would be to compare the unique benefits of 
offshoring innovation with in-country outsourcing innovation. For example, will country-
specific factors such as linguistic or cultural similarities make collaboration easier between 
countries in the context of OI? Also, an interesting avenue for future research would be to 
investigate whether SMEs should refrain from using OI given the difficulties surrounding the 
control and coordination of such innovation sourcing strategies, let alone the possibility of 
realising harmful consequences of OI in case of suppliers’ free-riding behaviour. Despite these 
limitations and generalisability precautions of OI in SMEs, we believe that this study 
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contributes to the OI management literature in SMEs and enhances our understanding of how 
SMEs and large firms are different. 
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Table 1. SMEs Sample Characteristics     
 Industry  Frequency % 
Plastic, paper, and rubber 32 16.0% 
Textile and wearing apparel 32 16.0% 
Food and beverages 23 11.5% 
Machinery and mechanical equipment 24 12.0% 
Pharmaceutical and chemicals  20 10.0% 
Wood and furniture 20 10.0% 
Metal and minerals 18 9.0% 
Electrical and electronics 16 8.0% 
Coke and petroleum 10 5.0% 
Other manufacturing  5 2.5% 
Title of respondents Frequency % 
Chief executive officer 8 4.0% 
Managing director 69 34.5% 
Managing partner 94 47.0% 
General manager  25 12.5% 
Others (top management position) 4 2.0% 
   
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Construct 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
1. Supplier's asset specificity 1.000     
2. Goal compatibility 0.480** 1.000    
3. Supplier’s complementary capabilities 0.597** 0.575** 1.000   
4. Supplier joint actions 0.433** 0.461** 0.408** 1.000  
5. Offshoring innovation  0.635** 0.436** 0.527** 0.316** 1.000 
        
Mean 5.528 5.613 5.613 5.527 5.598 
Standard deviation 0.656 0.675 0.630 0.816 0.658 
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Table 3. Results of direct, mediation and moderation effects 
 
Direct effect  Total Effect  Mediation  Moderation 
(Supplier's Asset 
Specificity x 
Supplier Joint 
Actions) 
Moderation (Goal 
Compatibility x 
Supplier Joint 
Actions) 
 
Hypothesis (H1, H2)  (H3, H4a, H4b) (H5a) (H5b) 
 
Effect / Unstandardized Coefficients 
 
b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) b (t) 
Supplier's asset specificity → supplier’s 
complementary capabilities 
0.403***(7.020)     
Goal compatibility →supplier’s complementary 
capabilities 
0.351***(6.310)     
Supplier's asset specificity → offshoring   
innovation  
 0.555***(8.977) 0.478***(7.004) 0.455***(6.283) 0.474***(6.678) 
Goal compatibility → offshoring innovation  0.169**(2.778) 0.099 (1.529) 0.061(0.828) 0.075(0.934) 
Supplier’s complementary capabilities→ offshoring 
innovation  
  0.192**(2.536) 0.194*(2.551) 0.191*(2.500) 
Supplier joint actions x Supplier's asset specificity    -0.053 (-1.381)  
Supplier joint actions x Goal compatibility     -0.0212(-0.687) 
Indirect effect (supplier's asset specificity)   0.077   
95% Confidence interval (supplier's asset 
specificity) 
  0.005-0.163   
Sobel test (supplier's asset specificity)   2.352*   
Indirect effect (goal compatibility)   0.068   
95% Confidence interval (goal compatibility)   0.006-0.133   
Sobel test (goal compatibility)   2.384* 
 
  
Degrees of freedom (d.f.) 197 197 196 194 194 
Variance Explained (R²) 0.465*** 0.425*** 0.444*** 0.449*** 0.445*** 
F-stats 85.488 72.911 52.091 31.649 31.133 
t and F-values significance levels: *p< 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Figure 1. Proposed model of supplier’s complementary capabilities of the offshore outsourcing 
innovation dyad  
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Appendix A 
Construct (Cronbach's alpha, composite reliability (CR), average variance extracted 
(AVE)) 
AMOS item 
loading 
Supplier's Asset Specificity (α = 0.71; CR = 0.73; AVE = 0.48)  
a) Our innovation requirements need highly specified human and physical resources 0.62 
b) The offshore supplier has made significant investment in specialized human and 
physical resources dedicated to our relationship 
0.81 
c) The offshore supplier has tailored its product and process development programs to 
match our requirements. 
0.63 
d) The offshore supplier has committed specialized skills in training our people*  
Goal Compatibility (α = 0.71; CR = 0.78; AVE = 0.55)  
a) Our firm and the offshore supplier have compatible goals 0.89 
b) Our firm and the offshore supplier support each other's objectives 0.57 
c) Our firm and the offshore supplier share the same goals in the relationship 0.74 
Supplier’s Complementary Capabilities (α = 0.74; CR = 0.70; AVE = 0.48)  
a) The offshore supplier contributes different capabilities to our relationship 0.81 
b) The offshore supplier has complementary strengths that are useful to our relationship*  
c) The offshore supplier has separate abilities that, when combined with our abilities 
enable us to achieve goals beyond our reach independently 
0.66 
d) The R&D efforts benefit from their closeness to both firms’ current products and 
processes 
0.58 
Supplier joint actions (α = 0.74; CR = 0.76; AVE = 0.53)  
a) We work jointly with the offshore supplier to reduce its costs 0.91 
b) We work jointly with the offshore supplier to improve its quality 0.59 
c) We work jointly with the offshore supplier on training its people 0.64 
Offshoring innovation (α = 0.73; CR = 0.74; AVE = 0.50)  
a) As result of our relationship with the offshore supplier, we have created new products 
and/or enhanced our current products. 
0.87 
b) As a result of our relationship with the offshore supplier, we have created new 
processes and/or improved our current processes. 
0.67 
c) As a result of our relationship with the offshore supplier, we have Increased our new 
product speed to market. * 
 
d) As a result of our relationship with the offshore supplier, we have Increased our patent 
application rate. 
0.55 
Model fit indices: Normed X² = 1.99 (≤2.0), p <0.001, comparative fit index (CFI) = 
0.934, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) =0.911, standardised root mean square residuals 
(SRMR)= 0.053, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.071. 
Note*Item dropped after CFA 
 
 
